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In the article, we analyse the impact of changing policy environments on the development of the third 
sector in Europe. Based on the results of systematic comparative research in eight European countries 
(Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom), we 
identify commonalities and differences. In a three-step analysis, we examine policy changes, effects on 
the third sector and responses by third sector organizations (TSOs) in the social domain. Overall, the 
third sector in Europe has proven resilient. However, not only have public and private funding decreased, 
the process for acquiring such funding has become more demanding for TSOs, as have requirements to 
be accountable. There are signs of a proliferation of more market-based, hybrid organizations. Despite 
this general trend towards marketization, the impact of policy changes varies across Europe with TSOs 
being better equipped to adapt and survive in countries where collaborative ties between the state and 
the third sector have traditionally been strong. 
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The policy environment for the third sector in Europe has significantly changed. Public management 
reforms, which in some countries started as early as the 1980s, have led to deregulation and increased 
cooperation with private actors in service delivery (Anheier and Krlev 2014; Bode and Brandsen, 2014). 
On top of this came the global economic and financial crisis of the late 2000s, which led to austerity 
policies and a reduction in public grants throughout Europe. As a result, relations between the state and 
the third sector have been changing. Finally, in a number of countries, governments that have, at best, 
an ambiguous relationship with the third sector, have come to power. The question is: how have third 
sector organizations (TSOs) reacted and how have they held up against this background? 
In this contribution, we use the results of a European research project to assess the effects of the 
changing policy environments on the third sector in Europe. The analysis is based on a cross-country 
comparison of eight European countries (Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Spain and the United Kingdom) using multiple methods. The analysis addressed the following three key 
questions: (1) How have policy environments changed for social TSOs, (2) what kind of opportunities 
and obstacles have they encountered and (3) how have social TSOs responded to changing policy 
environments? The focus of our comparative analysis is on TSOs working in the welfare domain as a 
key area of third sector engagement and cooperation with the state. 
First, we will outline the general background to the changes in national policy environments. 
Then we will, respectively, describe the theoretical and methodological approach that we took for the 
analysis. This will result in the identification of an analysis of commonalities and differences between 
countries. The paper ends with a short reflection on the current position of the third sector in Europe.   
 
2. Background 
The third, or non-profit sector ± FRPPRQO\XQGHUVWRRGDVD³VRFLDOVSDFHEH\RQGWKHPDUNHWWKHVWDWH
DQGWKHKRXVHKROG´6DODPRQDQG6RNRORZVNL± has played an important role in Europe. In many 
European countries, TSOs have a long tradition and fulfil vital functions in society, particularly in the 
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fields of welfare provision, education and labour inclusion (Evers and Laville, 2004; Enjolras et al., 
2018). The majority of the approximately 13.6 million people working in the European social economy 
belong to TSOs (Monzon & Chaves, 2017). Several trends have affected the third sector, some of which 
date back two decades, others which are more recent. 
In some respects, European third sectors are very different, with varying welfare state and third 
sector policy traditions (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Arts and Gelissen, 2010). One group includes 
corporatist welfare state systems such as Germany, Austria, France and the Netherlands. Historically, 
TSOs in these countries have developed a close relationship with the welfare state (Archambault et al. 
2014). Typically, the significance of the third sector is grounded in a comparatively strong welfare state 
and a tradition of collaboration with government, particularly at the local level. The principle of 
³VXEVLGLDULW\´LVDFHQWUDOIHDWXUHHVSHFLDOO\ZLWKUHVSHFWWRFKXUFK-related initiatives (Zimmer et al., 
2004). This means that TSOs traditionally had a privileged position as WKH VWDWH¶s partners in social 
service delivery. In France, TSOs have enjoyed quite a similar position, even though the role of church 
initiatives has been smaller. Spain¶VZHOIDUHVWDWHWUDGLWLRQFDQEHVWEHGHVFULEHGDV0HGLWHUUDQHDQ-style, 
with a strong role for the Catholic Church and the family in the social domain (Ferrera, 2010; Chaves 
and Zimmer, 2017). Countries such as Croatia and Poland have post-Communist welfare states, in 
which third sector evolution started after the end of socialism, thereby significantly later than in other 
countries, and is still weaker (Aidukaite 2009; Cook, 2010). The United Kingdom is usually classed as 
a liberal regime. For example, Salamon and Anheier (1998) and Salamon et al. (2017) grouped the UK 
alongside the US, due to its combination of a comparatively large voluntary sector and low welfare 
spending. At the same time, the UK retained some social democratic regime features, based on pro-state 
attitudes fostered by the goverQPHQW¶VZDUWLPHVXFFHVVHV and working-class mobilization (op cit, 1998: 
GUDZLQJRQ.HQGDOODQG.QDSSFKDSWHU6XFKµSUR-VWDWHDWWLWXGHV¶KDYHEHHQXQGHUVWUDLQ
and sometimes direct attack, in recent years. It is probably now safer to think of the UK as an evolving, 
unstable hybrid both containing and expressing a wide and complex range of social and political forces 
(see Macmillan and Kendall, 2019).  
 However, despite these marked differences, there have also been some cross-cutting 
developments in recent years. In particular, during governance reforms since the 1980s, so-FDOOHGµNew 
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Public MDQDJHPHQW¶130 approaches and practices included ³DJUHDWHUHPSKDVLVRQSHUIRUPDQFH´
especially through measurement of outputs³WKH LQMHFWLRQRIPDUNHW-W\SHPHFKDQLVPV´DQG³DZLGH
VSUHDG VXEVWLWXWLRQRI FRQWUDFWV IRUKLHUDUFKLFDO UHODWLRQDV WKHSULQFLSDO FRRUGLQDWLRQGHYLFH´ LQ WKH
public sector (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 10). As a result, TSOs are confronted with growing 
competition from for-profit organizations and with other TSOs, as well as stronger requirements for 
accountability.  
Also, in the late 2000s, European countries were hit by the global financial crisis, which has 
been described as ³WKHPRVWVHYHUHILQDQFLDOFULVLVVLQFHWKH*UHDW'HSUHVVLRQ´&ODHVVHQVHWDO. 
The economic downturn and cost of stimulus packages led to cutbacks in public spending at all levels 
of government (Lane, 2012; Zamora-Kapoor and Coller, 2014). These austerity policies in the European 
Union also deeply affected TSOs, which had, in all countries, been receiving at least some measure of 
public subsidy before the crisis (Pape et al., 2015). Simultaneously, the crisis also led to fewer donations 
and private grants for TSOs in Europe, particularly in Spain (Chaves et al., 2016), but also in countries 
with traditionally higher levels of private philanthropy, e.g. the Netherlands (Pape et al., 2015). 
 These general developments could be observed in all countries in our study. However, how they 
have affected TSOs appears to have been influenced strongly by historically-shaped institutions. In this 
paper, we examine the nature of this variation and its probable causes.  
 
3. Analytical framework 
To understand the effect of policy environments on the strategic actions of TSOs, we apply the theory 
of fields developed by Fligstein and McAdam (2011; 2012). This theory aims to explain how stability 
and change are achieved by social actors in circumscribed social arenas, ZKLFKDUHGHILQHGDV³VWUDWHgic 
DFWLRQILHOGV´$ILHOGLVD³EDVLFVWUXFWXUDOEXLOGLQJEORFNRIPRGHUQSROLWLFDORUJDQL]DWLRQDOOLIHLQWKH
economy, civil society and the VWDWH´ )OLJVWHLQ DQG McAdam, 2012: 3). Field theory is of general 
importance in the social sciences, as it provides a suitable way to address the structure/agency divide, 
as well as balancing micro and macro scales of analysis. In third sector studies, field theory can be 
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helpful for understanding the influence of the environment and institutional context on TSOs. In their 
study on the third sector in public policy provision at the local level, Stone and Sandfort (2009: 1072) 
argued that ³Whe policy field frame is a structured analytical approach to filtering elements of complex 
institutional structures while acknowledging the agency that individuals exercise to shape these 
structuUHV´ 
 The policy fields framework contains several theoretical elements, including policy domains, 
societal sectors, the structuration of fields, policy networks, and social skills (Stone and Sandfort, 2009). 
The structuration of fields refers to the individual actor and his or her ability or social skill to influence 
and be influenced by the structure of organizational fields and networks. Using the policy fields 
framework requires the following analytical steps: (1) determine primary policy domains, (2) specify 
relevant legal regulations (laws, vertical relationships and administrative authority), (3) determine which 
organizations have an interest in the problem and which have power to influence decisions, (4) specify 
linkages and ties among these actors, and (5) analyze how the structure of the local field constrains 
and/or enables organizational and individual action (Stone and Sandfort, 2009). An example of research 
that has used field theory in the context of the third sector is Macmillan et al.¶V (2013) study in the 
United Kingdom. It showed how the third sector can be XQGHUVWRRG DV D ³VWUDWHJLF DFWLRQ ILHOG´ 
consisting of organizations that are themselves fields and are part of vertical policy domains or sub-
fields such as health and housing (Macmillan et al. 2013). 
 In this contribution, we focus on European TSOs in the welfare domain as a strategic action 
field, which we will discuss as vertically organized fields, embedded in national welfare systems and 
structured by partnerships between the state and the third sector. We define policy environments as the 
³broader field environments´ in which each strategic action field is embedded (Fligstein and McAdam, 
2011: 2). In our analysis of social TSOs, policy environments encompass all regulations, rules and 
instruments that govern the work of social TSOs in their respective countries. In the part on the effects 
on the third sector, we discuss how these changes in policy environments, particularly changes in welfare 
state and third sector policies, have affected social TSOs in the eight countries in our sample. Response 
strategies, in turn, refer to the organizational strategies that social TSOs have adopted in dealing with 
these changes. Response strategies included adaptation, active adjustment and exit strategies, which are 
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related to the long-term trend of the economization of the third sector (Maier et al. 2016). In the 
discussion on response strategies, we will refer to the notion of organizational resilience, understood as 
³WKH DELOLW\ WR UHVSRQG SURGXFWLYHO\ WR VLJQLILFDQW GLVUXSWLYH FKDQJH DQG WUDQVIRUP FKDOOHQJHV LQWR
RSSRUWXQLWLHV´:LWPHUDQG0HOOLQJHU6: 255-256). Organizational resilience is closely linked to 
social skills that VRFLDODFWRUVQHHGLQRUGHUWR³FUHDWHDQGPDLQWDLQVWDEOHVRFLDOZRUOGVE\VHFXULQJWKH
FRRSHUDWLRQRIRWKHUV´)OLJVWHLQDQG0F$GDP 
 Overall, the aim of our analysis is to show how environmental conditions for social TSOs in 
Europe have changed over the past two decades, how these changes have impacted the third sector, 
particularly in the social domain, and to what extent TSOs have been able to respond effectively to 
changing policy environments. In the following paragraph, we will explain how we collected data in the 
eight countries. 
 
4. Methods and data collection 
This article is based on empirical research undertaken as part of the Third Sector Impact project, funded 
by the 7th Framework Programme of the European Union.1 Research was conducted in eight European 
countries (Austria, Croatia, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom). 
Data were collected and analyzed in 2014-2016 from the following sources:  
(1) Statistical data from secondary sources on the scope and size of the third sector, based on the 
conceptualization developed by Salamon and Sokolowski (2016). In this article we focus on a 
subgroup of the third sector, TSOs active in the social sector, which we shall for the sake of 
FRQYHQLHQFHUHIHUWRDVµVRFLDO762V¶. 
(2) For each country, 20 to 30 in-depth interviews with representatives of umbrella organizations 
and policy experts. They covered seven topics, including personnel development (paid staff and 
volunteers), finances, legal regulations and organizational formats, third sector governance, 
                                                          
1
 More information on the research design, the methods for data collection and analysis, the empirical data, the 
national reports and the participating institutions and individual researchers can be found on the project website: 
Third Sector Impact, https://thirdsectorimpact.eu/ (accessed 9 November 2018). 
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public image, sectoral infrastructure and equipment, as well as inter-sectoral and inter-
organizational cooperation.  
(3) An online survey among TSO representatives, covering the same topics as the interviews (see 
Enjolras et al., 2018). Between 75 and 250 responses per country were collected and analyzed 
according to a coding scheme. In the UK, the online survey was included in a regular survey 
and generated more than 1,000 responses. The online surveys were adjusted to national context 
and distributed via well-known communication channels and umbrella organizations. Due to 
the adjustments in each country, the surveys cannot be considered representative. However, the 
responses illustrate the perception of the main developments among third sector representatives 
and experts in the respective countries. 
(4) In each country, six in-depth case studies were conducted on organizational strategies for 
overcoming the challenges derived from the organizational field.  
  
The focus of this article is on European social TSOs which we define as TSOs working in the welfare 
domain. Traditionally, in Europe, the majority of these organizations have been social service providers. 
However, social TSOs also include more advocacy-oriented organizations, such as patient 
organizations, as well as grassroots initiatives, community groups and social enterprises. The underlying 
rationale for our decision to focus on TSOs in the welfare domain is threefold. First, social TSOs form 
a large and highly visible part of the third sector in Europe with close to 40% of TSOs being active in 
social services (Salamon et al., 1999). Second, the welfare domain is the area of the public sector where 
government-non-profit partnerships are traditionally strongest (Archambault et al. 2014). Changes in 
government policies and cooperation mechanisms will therefore most likely have an effect on the third 
sector at large, even though not all social TSOs are directly cooperating with the state. The third reason 
for selecting one policy domain is related to the comparative analysis. Focusing on TSOs in one policy 
area in eight countries allows us to identify commonalities and differences throughout Europe, which 
are independent from the differences between TSOs in various policy areas.  
 The focus on social TSOs also implies certain limitations. Third sector development in other 
policy areas, such as sport or culture, might differ from our analysis. However, in general, the 
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development of TSOs in Europe is closely connected with the predominant trends in their policy 
environments, which are largely shaped by state regulations and public funding policies. 
 
5. Findings 
The comparative analysis of third sector development revealed interesting commonalities and 
differences among European countries. The following analysis is structured on the basis of (1) changes 
in the policy environment, (2) the effects on the third sector, and (3) the responses of the third sector. 
 
Changes in the policy environment  
7KHDQDO\VLVRIWKHSROLF\HQYLURQPHQWDVWKH³EURDGHUILHOGHQYLURQPHQW´)OLJVWHLQDQG0F$GDP
2011: 2) of the strategic action field of social TSOs in Europe, included the institutional and legal context 
conditions that have affected European TSOs over the past two decades. The main transformation in the 
social domain is the introduction and continuation of public management reforms, which have 
profoundly altered the cooperation mechanism between the state and social TSOs throughout Europe. 
 In all countries, public management reforms have continued, although to varying degrees. The 
country that has gone furthest in this is the United Kingdom. Its third sector is considered strong 
because of its relatively wide ranging economic scope, scale and structure (Kendall, 2003; Salamon et 
al, 2017), but also because it is supported by a rich variety of public policy and practice arrangements, 
LQFOXGLQJ WKH UHJLPH RI FKDULW\ ODZ HODERUDWHG WD[ SURYLVLRQV LQVWLWXWLRQV WR IRVWHU ³LQIUDVWUXFWXUH´
(specialist representative organisations functioning within the sector itself, and also operating from 
inside the state), and the existence of supportive policy discourses, well embedded in and interwoven 
with national traditions of both liberalism and social democracy (Kendall, 2009). 1HZ/DERXU¶VSUH-
UHFHVVLRQ³PDLQVWUHDPLQJ´RIWKLVVHFWRU.HQGDOOIROORZHGE\WKHSXUVXLWand crystallization of 
extreme austerity policies under the Coalition and Conservative administrations from 2010 onwards, 
served to dramatize, amplify, and generalize this instability, making it much more politically visible, 
and substantively consequential for the sector in terms of political and economic resources. While these 
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gRYHUQPHQWV¶UKHWRULFKDVUHPDLQHGXSEHDW± the latest versLRQUHIHUVWRFKDULWLHVDVFHQWUDOWRWKH³VKDUHG
VRFLHW\´ ± now that 'DYLG&DPHURQ¶V ³ELJVRFLHW\´KDVEHHQDEDQGRQHG ± the realities on the ground 
have been deeply problematic. This has not only been because of severe cuts to relevant public social 
policy budgets, alongside the insensitive and crude application of NPM approaches; but also because of 
volunteering-related (including governance) challenges, and an increasingly difficult media 
environment, toxified by scandals (see Kendall et al, 2018).  
 In countries with a corporatist welfare system such as Austria, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands, TSOs have remained important players in welfare arrangements and social stability has 
been quite high (More-Hollerweger et al., 2014; Brandsen and Pape, 2015). The biggest change was the 
shift towards NPM reforms, in which TSOs lost their privileged position in welfare state arrangements. 
This was particularly the case in social welfare, where the establishment of quasi-markets increased 
controlling and accountability mechanisms within the sector. Competitive tendering procedures were 
opened up to commercial providers, whose share of the market has since been rising, particularly in 
areas like domiciliary care (Zimmer et al., 2016). In France, for instance, between 2005 and 2011, public 
grants were cut by 17% (3% less per year on average) while public contracts increased by 73% during 
the same period (10% per year on average) (Tchernonog, 2013). Extensive reporting obligations 
increased the administrative burden for TSOs³%XUHDXFUDWL]DWLRQLVDQLPSRUWDQWNH\ZRUGIRUXV:H
observed that many TSOs became so occupied with explaining and legitimizing their projects that not 
much time remainVIRUWKHLURSHUDWLRQDOZRUN´1on-profit expert, Germany, June 2015). Also, due to 
the short-term nature of contracts, the third sector faces more difficulties in building long-term 
partnerships with governments and other stakeholders. 
Sometimes the pressure came less in the shape of budget cuts than of increasing decentralization 
and complexity. Between 2005 and 2011, in France, for example, public funding to associations only 
decreased from 51% to 49%. However, this apparently minor decrease masks profound shifts within 
public funding (Tchernonog, 2013). Along with a more general decentralization process, the 
contribution of the national state to the third sector decreased in favour of territorial funding schemes. 
As a result, funds were parcelled out across governments at different levels and were therefore 
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increasingly variable and uncertain. Public resources most frequently come from territorial or local 
governments, linking them to specific projects and increasing the administrative costs for associations. 
These reforms have changed how social organizations engage in service delivery. Until the 
1990s, public funds granted full cost coverage. The development of quasi-markets and performance-
related remuneration has led to a highly-differentiated array of contracts. Generally speaking, the 
financial risk of providing services has been shifted towards third sector service providers. Moreover, 
TSOs are generally not reimbursed for providing a supply structure, but only for providing the service 
itself. The increased accountability requirements in social service delivery can also constitute an 
LPSHGLPHQWIRURUJDQL]DWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQWRUDVRQH762UHSUHVHQWDWLYHGHVFULEHGLW³0DQ\UHVRXUFHV
are wasted because of the funding system. We invest a lot of energy in subsidies and grant applications 
that work with a competitive tender system. If we do not win a grant, we lose the costs for investment 
DQGGHYHORSPHQW´762UHSUHVHQWDWLYH7KH1HWKHUODQGV6HSWHPEHU 
 Throughout the past two decades, some countries have also seen significant changes in third 
sector-specific legal regulations. A major change in Spain and France was the adoption of a Law on 
Social Solidarity Economy (SSE) in 2011 and 2014, respectively (Petrella and Richez-Battesti, 2016; 
Chaves and Zimmer, 2017). This law builds upon the criteria defining SSE: a purpose other than the 
distribution of profits, democratic governance, reinvestment of profits and compulsory asset lock. It 
included associations, cooperatives, mutual organizations and foundations. It also opened up the field 
of the SSE to commercial enterprises whose economic activity purpose is social utility (support to 
persons in vulnerable situations, combating exclusion and inequalities, education in citizenship, 
sustainable development) and whose management meets the following criteria: allocation of financial 
surpluses to a social mission and to compulsory reserves, no distribution of shares on capital markets 
and an equitable wage policy (with a wage scale from 1 to 10 maximum). These can be labelled solidarity 
enterprises of social utility (ESUS) by public authorities at a regional level (prefecture). In Spain, as a 
UHVXOWRIWKHOREE\LQJDFWLYLW\RIWKHQDWLRQDOXPEUHOOD³6RFLDO7KLUG6HFWRU3ODWIRUP´376new laws 
on social TSOs and on volunteering were adopted in 2015. In addition, tax incentives for donations to 
organizations serving the public good were introduced in 2014.  
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 In the post-Communist countries of Europe, the legal frameworks for the third sector have also 
been strengthened over the past two decades. Poland has seen the development of a coherent legal 
framework for the third sector, most of which occurred prior to the 2010s (1DáĊF] HW DO . 
Specifically, it was shaped by the Law on Foundations (1984), already introduced during Communist 
times, the Law on Associations (1989) and the Law on Public Benefit Activities and Volunteering 
(2003). These regulations form a consistent set of norms, which regulate the activities of TSOs and their 
relations with the state. There have not been any major changes to this legal framework in recent years. 
In the last two decades, partly due to an increase in public funding, the number of TSOs in Poland grew 
exponentially, from over 27,000 in 1997 to over 83,000 in 2012, with employment in the sector rising 
from 81,000 to RYHUMREV/HĞHWDO+RZHYHUSXEOLFIXQGLQJhas fallen again in recent 
years. Also, despite the apparent stability and growth, there remains the possibility that the current 
government of the Law and Justice Party will make significant changes. A government plenipotentiary 
for civil society was established in 2016 and there were debates on the third sector in the National 
Development Council, an advisory body to the President. Further, in the online survey, many TSO 
representatives did not consider the current government as supportive and felt they were not taken 
seriously as a partner in the planning and delivery of social services. It is, as yet, hard to predict where 
this will lead. 
 During the same period, the third sector in Croatia also experienced notable legislative changes, 
notably the 2014 Law on Associations and the 2015 Law on the Financial Operation and Bookkeeping 
of Non-3URILW 2UJDQL]DWLRQV %HåRYDQ HW DO  7KH IRUPHU LQWURGXFHG DQ REOLJDWLRQ IRU all 
associations to re-register, while the latter introduced more demanding procedures for tenders, financing 
DQGERRNNHHSLQJ%RWKZHUHHVWDEOLVKHGZLWKWKHVWDWHGDLPRILQFUHDVLQJWKHVHFWRU¶VWUDQVSDUHQF\DQG
strengthening financial control, although experts have criticised them as too restrictive and endangering 
WKHYLDELOLW\RIVPDOOHUHVSHFLDOO\QHZO\HVWDEOLVKHGJUDVVURRWVDVVRFLDWLRQV%HåRYDQHWDO)RU
instance, a TSO now needs to maintain double-entry bookkeeping for the first three years after 
establishment, which limits its activities. Such overregulation, as representatives of the third sector 
perceive it, is an unfavourable environment for strengthening social entrepreneurship and social 
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LQQRYDWLRQ%HåRYDQHWDO$WWKHVDme time, these new trends can constitute a risk for more 
traditional or smaller TSOs which lack the capacity to adjust and adapt. 
 Overall, the main common changes of the policy environment for TSOs in Europe include the 
impact of NPM reforms on cooperation mechanisms between the state and the third sector, as well as a 
related decrease in public funding, growing accountability and reporting requirements and intensified 
competition between profit and non-profit providers over scarce funding resources. These trends have 
been stronger in European countries with a liberal, Mediterranean or post-Communist welfare system 
than in countries with a corporatist welfare system. 
 
Effects on the third sector 
The changes in the policy environment have affected the strategic action field of social TSOs to varying 
degrees. This development can mainly be attributed to the differences in the tradition of welfare state 
and third sector policies in Europe. In the countries with a corporate welfare system, despite policy 
shifts, the overall size of the third sector has remained broadly stable. In both Germany and France 
(between 2008 and 2014), the number of TSOs has in fact been growing (Zimmer et al., 2016; 
CNCRESS, 2017); meanwhile, in Austria and the Netherlands the number of TSOs has remained 
stable (Brandsen et al., 2016; Simsa et al., 2016). However, changes in policy frameworks have led to 
changes in the composition of the sector. In Germany, the areas with the highest organizational growth 
rate have been health, consumer interest, education and international solidarity. Around 40% of 
organizations active in those fields were founded after 2000. Asset-based organizations, such as limited 
liability companies and foundations, grew sharply, while member-based organizations grew to a far 
lesser degree; 51% of limited liability companies and 50% of foundations were founded after 2000, as 
compared to only 19% of cooperatives and 23% of associations (Bertelsmann Stiftung et al. 2012). Thus, 
the composition of the sector is shifting in favour of TSOs closer to the market. In Austria and the 
Netherlands, similar trends can be identified. In France, we can observe an increase in the number of 
TSOs rather than an organizational evolution in their policy fields (CNCRESS, 2017). 
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With regard to the revenue structure of TSOs, there were important shifts in the shares of 
different income sources. While in the 1990s, public grants were still the biggest funding source for 
German TSOs, funds generated by business activities, e.g. service charges and fees, are now the most 
important source of revenue (Priller et al., 2012). Due to project-based public grants, TSOs that are 
highly dependent on public funds have been confronted with short planning intervals and often lack the 
resources necessary to invest in a sustainable infrastructure (Priemer et al., 2015; Simsa et al., 2016). In 
Austria, too, the overall share of public funding has been decreasing, whereas market income has gained 
importance, though to a lesser degree than in Germany. Membership fees and donations have increased 
slightly and public funding still accounts for more than 50% of 762V¶EXGJHWV (Pennersdorfer et al., 
2013). Nevertheless, besides direct cuts in public funding, TSOs have H[SHULHQFHGLQGLUHFWRU³FUHHSLQJ´
cuts, such as no adequate adjustments to inflation, public funder expectations of an increase in output 
even with the same level of funding, or the growing need to pre-finance services. 
To summarize, in all of these countries, TSOs have faced budget cuts, especially at the regional 
and the municipal levels, though these were less dramatic than in Southern Europe. Simultaneously, 
many third sector representatives reported a slight deterioration in public opinion towards the third 
sector, with reduced levels of public trust in the sector (Simsa and More-Hollerweger, 2013). This means 
that TSOs have found it harder to generate the necessary public support for their work at a time when 
they were already under pressure. 
Despite the cuts in public grants, exacerbated by the crisis of 2008, TSOs in France have proved 
to be quite resilient (Petrella and Richez-Battesti, 2016). They still account for more than 10% of total 
employment in the economy. Although third sector employment decreased slightly in the crisis years of 
2011 and 2012, it has subsequently recovered, with a total increase of 0.8% between 2008 and 2013. At 
the same time, employment in the rest of the French economy increased by only 0.2% during this period. 
Since 2008, employment in SSE has in fact been more or less stable, even showing a slightly positive 
trend. Regarding the size of the sector, the number of organizational dissolutions increased slightly 
between 2008 and 2010, but decreased afterwards and is now even lower than before the crisis 
(CNCRESS, 2014). Furthermore, the 2014 Law on Social and Solidarity Economy created new financial 
tools (enlargement of socially oriented pension funds, support for social investment, tax incentives for 
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philanthropy and social impact contract, etc.) and thereby contributed to the process of financial 
hybridization in French TSOs (Petrella and Richez-Battesti, 2016). 
Other countries have been hit harder. In the United Kingdom, the funding environment proved 
extremely challenging for TSOs, although there has been variation in the extent of austerity measures 
taken according to policy subfield. Many organizations have ceased to operate, downscaled, or 
repositioned themselves relationally towards the state in response to the deterioration of local and 
national conditions. Meanwhile, others have maintained activity levels, although the sustainability or 
otherwise of measures taken to allow this is often considered unclear at best, or severely compromised 
at worst. Much more recently, large datasets on the third sector have shown significant variation by 
subfield and according to other features, including size, age and the extent of deprivation encountered 
geographically, but it is also possible to present an aggregated picture (Clifford, 2017; Kendall et al., 
2018). Overall, perceived shortfalls in local government and foundation funding have been experienced 
as the most prevalent financial constraints in recent years (Kendall et al., 2016).  
In Spain, traditional quangos (quasi-autonomous NGOs) came under pressure in the aftermath 
of the 2012 economic crisis, which had a greater impact there than in the other countries in our sample. 
Austerity was felt across Europe, but had a particularly strong bearing on the third sector in Spain 
(Zamora-Kapoor and Coller, 2014). As a consequence of the economic crisis, Spain had one of the 
highest unemployment rates in Europe (around 25%), many working poor and people at risk of severe 
poverty, and a major increase in inequality. Since the major fields of the third sector are poverty, 
immigration, social inclusion, homelessness, the unemployed and services to vulnerable people, the 
demand for third sector services has greatly increased (Fundación Lealtad, 2013), or as one expert 
H[SODLQHG³762VQRZKDYHWRDVVLVWmore people with fewer UHVRXUFHV´1RQ-profit expert, Spain, June 
2015). At the same time, the crisis had an uneven impact on social TSOs. Between 2010 and 2013, 
public subsidies and grants for these organizations decreased by 30.1% (Chaves et al., 2016). Nearly a 
quarter of TSOs dissolved, more than half were involved in human resources and budget restructuring 
processes, while only a few percent - in general, the big TSOs - maintained or increased their level of 
activity. Simultaneously, however, new activist organizations have become stronger in Spain and are 
able to mobilize for social needs. 
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In both Croatia and Poland, given the structural weaknesses of the third sector, financial 
cutbacks hit harder than in countries where the sector was already better established. On the one hand, 
there had been a steady increase in public finance over the preceding decades. On the other, it has 
remained low, compared to other countries in Europe and has, in some areas, even been reduced due to 
budget cuts. However, it should be noted that the availability of reliable statistics makes it impossible 
to pinpoint the effects precisely. In Poland, the responses to the online survey show that TSO 
representatives share a widespread desire for more public assistance, combined with a lack of 
satisfaction with OHJDO UHJXODWLRQV DQG UHODWLRQV ZLWK SXEOLF ERGLHV /HĞ HW DO  /LNHZLVH LQ
Croatia, the lack of public funding was seen as a significant problem for third sector development 
%HåRYDQHWDO 
 
Responses of the third sector 
The responses of social TSOs to changes in their policy environments have shown strong commonalities 
across Europe. TSOs have adopted business-style management methods with regard to social 
competences, the design of organizational structures, the management of diversity, contradictions, 
flexibility and external relationships (Simsa et al., 2016). In particular, TSOs working in the areas of 
health and social services have adapted their governance structures and management styles, a move 
necessary to gain legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders. 
At the organizational level, many TSOs have tried to professionalize their management and 
strengthen their entrepreneurial dimension. As elsewhere, most have adopted managerial tools borrowed 
from the private sector (control, quality management, accountancy) in order to improve their managerial 
professionalism, though in different ways (Petrella et al., 2014; Petrella and Richez-Battesti, 2016). To 
reduce costs and survive in a more competitive environment, TSOs have been searching for economies 
of scale and synergies by merging or creating networks at the territorial level. Organizational innovation, 
e.g. pooling resources, setting up umbrella organizations, networking and forming new alliances with 
the private sector, has become a key response strategy (comp. Tzifakis et. al., 2017). Some successful 
organizations adopted growth strategies in alliance with the private sector. In doing so, TSO 
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representatives, however, emphasised the importance of preserving the social qualities of the third 
VHFWRU³,QRUGHUWREHFRQYLQFLQJWRRXUVWakeholders, the social purpose of our organization has to be 
VHWLQVWRQH´762UHSUHVHQWDWLYH)UDQFH1RYHPEHU 
 TSOs are not only expected to act in accordance with accounting standards, but are increasingly 
encouraged to measure social impact, for instance, by applying the Social Return on Investment method 
(Maier et.al., 2015; Simsa et. al., 2014). This pressure comes not only from governments, but also from 
philanthropists and other private donors. TSOs often compete with one another when they apply for 
public contracts and donations. However, given the nature of social problems, there is an equal need for 
collaboration within the sector. This collaboration takes place in the public domain (e.g. in the context 
of caring communities) and in case management (Grohs and Bogumil, 2011).  
Fundraising and diversification of resources have become more important. This has included 
new forms of financing such as crowd-investing, crowdfunding and venture philanthropy, though these 
have been less significant in practice than is often suggested. TSOs have competed in a growing number 
of tenders, which have carried additional administrative tasks and led to bureaucratization. In France 
and Spain, TSOs faced major difficulties in mobilizing private resources. One was that the privatization 
RIUHVRXUFHVFDPHIURPDQLQFUHDVHLQXVHUV¶FRQWULEXWLRQVIRUWKHVDOHRIJRRGVDQGVHUYLFHVZKLFK
raised issues of unequal access to services (Petrella and Richez-Battesti, 2016). Sponsorship, venture 
philanthropy and crowdfunding were difficult and limited in scope. These difficulties were hard to 
overcome, due a lack of competence and time on the part of the organizations, as well as a failure to 
communicate impact effectively to private investors. As public and private funds decreased during the 
economic crisis, Spanish TSOs mainly adjusted by downshifting resources, attracting more volunteers 
and reducing the number of paid staff. Facing similar problems, TSOs in Croatia and Poland have 
developed similar strategies. Mostly, these organizational strategies were aimed at improving their 
position vis-à-vis state institutions. More organizations have been developing economic activities and 
FRPSHWLQJIRU³ZHLJKW\´(8IXQGVLQZKLFKWKH\KDYHEHHQUHODWLYHO\VXFFHVVIXO However, TSOs in 
both France and Spain have differed in their capacity to adjust to the changes in their policy environment: 
³6RPHRUJDQL]DWLRQVDUHDEOHWRGHYHORSLQRWKHUSROLF\DUHDVDVWKH\SRVVHVVFRPSDUDWLYHNQRZOHGJH
DQG RSSRUWXQLWLHV´ QRQ-profit expert, Croatia, October 2016). Depending on their organizational 
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capacities, TSOs can choose for different survival strategies: Some barely survive; others succeed due 
WRSURIHVVLRQDOL]DWLRQDFFHVVWR(8IXQGLQJDQGQHZPDQDJHPHQWWHFKQLTXHV%HåRYDQHWDO 
 Generally, three different types of responses could be identified: (1) adaptation, (2) strategic 
adjustment, and (3) exit strategies. Adaptation included all organizational strategies to conform to the 
market logic introduced by governance reforms. Strategic adjustment included all organizational 
strategies TSOs adopted to adjust to the changing policy environment without neglecting their 
characteristics as third sector organizations. Some TSOs pooled resources in order to collaborate in the 
face of increased competition. Other TSOs invested in social innovation to improve their position. The 
third organizational strategy was exit, including closure of the organization as well as organizational 
reorientation. Although the overall size of the third sector remains relatively stable in Europe, there have 
been social TSOs that have left the strategic action field, either by readjusting their organizational 
mission or by terminating work altogether. The TSOs that adapted most successfully had the best 
prospects of organizational sustainability, either by growing or by developing a unique selling point for 
the organization. Furthermore, many TSOs applied strategies to reduce supply and increase the density 
of work. Strategic adjustment in many cases included organizational innovation that helped TSOs to 
reorient themselves and flourish despite difficult circumstances. 
 These developments could fundamentally transform the structure of the third sector in countries 
such as France and Spain, where it is still mainly comprised of small organizations. In turn, this may 
raise questions over participation and democratic governance. While it is too early to tell, the period 
following the global financial crisis has seen the emergence of large third sector groups and hybrid 
organizations developing partnerships with private businesses, in particular in the fields of work 
integration and social services. Many have started to think about self-sustainability and have been 
considering forming new types of organizations that provide economic support to their social mission, 
such as social enterprises and social cooperatives.  
 However, the long-term significance of these developments is hard to gauge at this point. It is 
hard to say whether they constitute a fundamental shift towards market-based TSOs, such as social 
enterprises and cooperatives. In some countries, such as France and Spain, these organizational types 
have a longer history. Common to both countries is that the positions of the SSE and the cooperative 
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movement are strong in terms of staff, economic activity and support by national umbrella organizations 
(Petrella et al., 2014; Monzon and Chaves, 2017). In other countries, by contrast, such concepts are 
relatively new. In Germany, the ³entrepreneurial company´ (Unternehmergesellschaft) was introduced 
in 2008 in order to facilitate the establishment of social enterprise start-ups (Weitemeyer 2014: 49). 
Additionally, the auditing requirements for small cooperatives were simplified in 2017. In the 
Netherlands, social enterprises are gaining ground, and without a specific legal status. As of 2017, more 
than 350 social enterprises had joined their umbrella organisation in the Netherlands (Social Enterprise 
NL, s.a.). However, it is hard to gauge the significance of this, as they are still marginal and there has 
been little pickup in national policy debates. At best, this is a transitional phase (Witkamp et al., 2011), 
but it could be just a passing fad. In Poland and Croatia, there was still a limited understanding of what 
social enterprises are, as well as a lack of finance, human resource capacity and expertise (9LQFHWLüHW 
al., 2013).  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Despite increasing difficulties in the regulatory and financial environment, the third sector in Europe 
has generally proved remarkably resilient and adaptable to changing policy environments. Although the 
European financial crisis has dented the growth of the third sector in some countries, there has been no 
dramatic drop or displacement. Overall, the number of social TSOs has been stable or even growing. 
The majority of TSOs have proved to be resilient in dealing with the changes in the policy environment.  
 Within this general trend, there are noticeable differences between countries. In France and 
Germany, the numbers of social TSOs are again growing, while in Austria and The Netherlands the 
numbers remain stable. In Spain, traditional TSOs have come under pressure in the aftermath of the 
economic crisis, whereas new activist organizations have become stronger. In Central and Eastern 
Europe, the third sector only emerged at the end of Communist rule and collaboration between the state 
and the third is still less stable, which has left the latter more vulnerable. 
 Overall, the European financial crisis and subsequent austerity policies have not unbalanced the 
third sector in Europe. With respect to state ± third sector relations, what we have observed is basically 
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the continuation of trends that had set in well before the crisis: the gradual unravelling of traditional 
modes of partnership and, under the influence of New Public Management, a greater emphasis on 
contracting-out and managerialism, which is particularly visible in the welfare domain.   
 The resilience of the sector derives from its adaptability in the face of such trends, which means 
that the major changes in social TSOs are less quantitative than qualitative. Our findings confirm earlier 
studies that observed a qualitative change in the nature of TSOs (Evers, 2005). Hybrid organisations, 
once an obscure phenomenon, have now become more common, which is reflected in third sector 
research (Henriksen e.a., 2015; Schnurbein e.a., 2018). Social TSOs have adopted business-like methods 
and business-like organizational forms, not only to diversify resources, but also to gain legitimacy in the 
eyes of existing funders. This has led to further professionalization, but also to further 
commercialization. Those organizations that have been able to scale up activities have generally been 
better equipped to survive and grow. 
 Academically, this development had led to a convergence of debates on the third sector and 
social enterprises. Whereas these were formerly to a large extent separated, they are increasingly dealing 
with similar issues and organisations (Baglioni, 2017). This was symbolically reflected in the revised 
third sector definition published in this journal (Salamon & Sokolowski, 2016) which relaxed the non-
profit criterion that was previously so contentious.  
 Another qualitative shift has been the renewed localisation of the third sector. In France, Spain 
and The Netherlands, decentralization has led to a growing relevance of local TSOs vis-à-vis national 
umbrella organizations. Due to an increase of funding opportunities at the municipal level, social TSOs 
in these countries have increasingly shifted their activities to the local level. Potentially, that makes it 
worthwhile for third sector research to engage more fully with discussions on service innovation and 
collaborative innovation.   
 Although we have emphasized the basic stability of the third sector, it is worth noting some 
important developments that could change the picture. There may be existential threats to the third 
sector, but they are less economic than political, and (so far) they mostly affect TSOs outside the welfare 
domain. In certain European countries, most visibly in Hungary and Poland, the third sector has again 
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become the subject of political controversy and repression. It remains to be seen whether this constitutes 
a blip in the historical pattern of growth or a turning-point.  
 Another, more hopeful development is that there is a growth of new third sector organisations. 
There is a notable rise in the visibility of activist groups (within cities, for instance, see Domaradzka, 
2018). In the area of social services, grassroots organisations have emerged to fill the gap between a 
rising market and a retreating state (for example, tenant cooperatives in overheated housing markets, see 
Brandsen & Helderman, 2012; Suter and Gmür, 2018). Given the scarcity of reliable statistics, it is hard 
to assess the overall impact of such initiatives.  
 In other words, future third sector research has several worthwhile ideals to pursue. The first is 
to improve our quantitative measurement of the third sector, which is still constrained by inadequate or 
missing statistics. The second is to better understanding the effects of the qualitative change that social 
TSOs have been going through, as hybridisation has been spurred by shifts in governance. The third is 
to document and map the rise of new kinds of third sector organisations underneath or at the edges of 
our current frame. 
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